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16
17
18 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
 19 **FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

20 BEHRING REGIONAL CENTER LLC,
 21
 22 Plaintiff,

v.

23 ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
 24 in his official capacity as Secretary of the
 25 Department of Homeland Security,
 26
 27 UR M. JADDOU,
 28 in her official capacity as Director of the
 United States Citizenship & Immigration
 Services,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:22-cv-02487-VC

**BRIEF OF INVEST IN THE USA AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
 PLAINTIFF**

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1 **INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF THE *AMICUS CURIAE***

2 Over the past several decades, Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
3 vices (“USCIS”) has certified more than 600 EB-5 regional centers. These centers collectively
4 oversee billions of dollars of investments from thousands of investors. Following expiration of the
5 prior statute, Congress enacted the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (“Integrity Act” or
6 “Act”) to achieve—in Congress’s express words—“reauthorization” of the Regional Center Pro-
7 gram (or “Program”). The Act ensures that foreign investors will continue investing billions of
8 dollars into job-creating projects in the United States, with a statutory emphasis on projects located
9 in high unemployment and rural areas.

10 But with the click of a mouse, USCIS turned the statute on its head by dismantling the
11 program entirely. USCIS declared, by a web posting, that the hundreds of previously approved
12 regional centers are now all deauthorized. If they wish to continue operating, these centers must
13 invest significant time and money to start the certification process anew. Given enormous pro-
14 cessing delays, it will take USCIS many years to recertify all these regional centers, entirely deci-
15 mating this significant industry in the interim. And by this same web posting, USCIS appears to
16 leave existing EB-5 investors in the surprising position that they are no longer protected by the
17 regulations governing regional centers.

18 This action is plainly unlawful. Because it contravenes the clear statutory text and defies
19 Congress’s intent, it must be set aside. And even if the statute were silent and USCIS had some
20 regulatory flexibility, it erred here by taking this major regulatory action without notice-and-com-
21 ment rulemaking and by acting in a most arbitrary and capricious manner.

22 *Amicus* Invest in the USA (“IIUSA”) is the national membership-based 501(c)(6) non-profit
23 trade association for the EB-5 Regional Center Program. IIUSA represents over one hundred re-
24 gional center members serving forty-seven states and territories. Its mission is to advocate for EB-
25 5 stakeholders, including its regional center members, to foster domestic economic development
26 and job creation. USCIS’s action, which categorically deauthorized all existing regional centers,
27 puts the very existence of many of IIUSA’s regional center members at risk. *Amicus* therefore has
28 a vital interest on behalf of its members to demonstrate the illegality of USCIS’s action.

1 * * *

2 1. The Regional Center Program streamlines the statutory requirements for an EB-5 visa
3 by allowing foreign investors to passively invest in job-creating enterprises in the United States.
4 Although initially enacted as a pilot program, the Regional Center Program has become a well-
5 established—indeed the nearly exclusive—means of obtaining an EB-5 visa. In the 1993 Appro-
6 priations Act, Congress set aside a small number of visas for a few years exclusively for applicants
7 under the Regional Center Program. Over the years, Congress has reauthorized that set-aside pro-
8 vision dozens of times. Throughout that time, USCIS codified extensive regulations governing the
9 Program and oversaw regional center operations. Today, almost all EB-5 visas go to regional center
10 investors, rendering the initial set-aside pilot-program provision superfluous.

11 More than 600 regional centers—thriving small and medium-size businesses—have be-
12 come officially “designated” by USCIS as eligible to receive EB-5 investments and deploy those
13 funds into job-creating projects compliant with the Program’s requirements. These regional centers
14 have spent thousands of hours and millions of dollars in seeking and maintaining their designations.
15 In reliance on these designations, thousands of foreign investors have invested billions of dollars
16 into regional center projects in the hopes of obtaining lawful permanent residency in the United
17 States. The regional center designation serves to protect those investors.

18 2. Following a lapse in the program, Congress enacted the Integrity Act. Recognizing the
19 longstanding predominance of the Regional Center Program in the EB-5 visa category, Congress
20 codified the Program in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the United States Code,
21 making visas available through the Regional Center Program through September 2027. The Integ-
22 rity Act maintained the Regional Center Program materially intact as it had been established by
23 regulation, but it included measures to specifically address the occurrence of fraud and the involve-
24 ment of “bad actors” in regional center operations. By all accounts—as evidenced throughout the
25 statutory text—Congress intended USCIS and regional centers to promptly get back to work.

26 3. In view of the Integrity Act’s plain text and manifest purpose, USCIS took a most ex-
27 traordinary action. The agency announced by means of an “alert” on its website—not so different
28 in form or complexity than a character-limited tweet—that all preexisting regional centers (over

1 600 of them) were categorically decertified. As USCIS would have it, rather than the Integrity Act
 2 serving as a “reauthorization” and strengthening of the preexisting Regional Center Program—the
 3 Act instead *canceled* all existing regional centers, forcing the industry to start over from nothing.

4 The statutory text does not tolerate such a construction. To the contrary, the text compels
 5 the conclusion that preexisting regional center designations continue to hold force. The Act is struc-
 6 tured such that the new anti-fraud measures sit on top of the preexisting regulatory structure.
 7 USCIS’s contrary decision—that all existing regional centers have been decertified overnight—
 8 renders statutory provisions in the Act unintelligible. And USCIS’s conclusion does not square with
 9 the import of the statutory text: Congress enacted the Integrity Act expressly to *shore up* the Re-
 10 gional Center Program, not to destroy it and remove any regulation of the billions already invested.

11 Even if there were a statutory gap for USCIS to fill here, its action was unlawful. USCIS’s
 12 action flouts the essential requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking in defying its own reg-
 13 ulations. More, in effectively eviscerating the Program, USCIS failed to consider important aspects
 14 of the problem, the costs of its rule, and serious reliance interests. USCIS’s action must be set aside.

15 ARGUMENT

16 I. THE INTEGRITY ACT’S PLAIN TEXT FORECLOSES USCIS’S ACTION

17 Courts “shall” “set aside” agency action that is “not in accordance with law” or “in excess
 18 of statutory ... authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “[I]t is axiomatic that administrative agencies may
 19 act only pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress.” *Air All. Houston v. EPA*, 906 F.3d
 20 1049, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “If Congress has spoken directly to the precise question
 21 at issue and the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
 22 agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” *Id.* (cleaned up).

23 The statutory text is plain: When Congress explicitly *reauthorized* the Regional Center Pro-
 24 gram via the Integrity Act, Congress did not simultaneously *deauthorize* the more than 600 ap-
 25 proved regional centers. Given the manifest intent of the statute to promptly return the Program to
 26 operation, that would be a bizarre congressional choice. In all, the Act reflects an unambiguous
 27 intent that approved regional centers sustain their operations and retain their designation so that
 28 USCIS can smoothly implement the Integrity Act and reinvigorate the Program. USCIS’s action,

1 however, defies the statutory text and “is incompatible with both the mechanics and purpose of the
 2 entire statute.” *Columbia Riverkeeper v. Wheeler*, 944 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2019). Because
 3 USCIS acted contrary to the statute’s text and purpose, its action was “in excess of statutory au-
 4 thority and must be set aside.” *Friends of Animals v. Haaland*, 997 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 2021).

5 **A. The statutory text affirmatively ensures preexisting regional centers retain
 6 their designations and continue operating without interruption**

7 “In construing a statute, we begin, as always, with the language of the statute.” *California*
 8 *v. Trump*, 963 F.3d 926, 944 (9th Cir. 2020). The text compels the conclusion that, per clear con-
 9 gressional direction, preexisting approved regional centers need not begin their certification pro-
 10 cesses anew. Rather than strip regional centers of their designation, as USCIS suggests, the Integrity
 11 Act confirms that preexisting regional centers may continue their operations uninterrupted.

12 **1.** The Integrity Act defines a “regional center” under the reenacted Program in terms that
 13 encompass preexisting regional centers. Specifically, the Act makes visas available to “qualified
 14 immigrants participating in a program implementing this paragraph that involves a regional center
 15 in the United States, which has been designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security on the basis
 16 of a proposal for the promotion of economic growth, including prospective job creation and in-
 17 creased domestic capital investment.” Integrity Act § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(i)).
 18 Preexisting approved regional centers already conform to those requirements.

19 As a threshold matter, preexisting regional centers are participating “in a program imple-
 20 menting this *paragraph*.” Integrity Act § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(i)) (emphasis added).
 21 The “paragraph” at issue is 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5), the general EB-5 category—*not* the *subparagraphs*
 22 added by the Integrity Act that codify the Regional Center Program. Under the Act, then, the pilot
 23 program under which existing regional centers were designated was “a program implementing this
 24 *paragraph*.” See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
 25 Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 610(a) (Oct. 6, 1992) (“1993 Appropriations
 26 Act”) (“Of the visas otherwise available under section 203(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality
 27 Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)), the Secretary of State, together with the Attorney General, shall set aside
 28 visas for a pilot program to *implement the provisions* of such section.”) (emphasis added).

1 Preexisting regional centers also have already been “designated by the Secretary of Home-
 2 land Security on the basis of a proposal for the promotion of economic growth, including prospec-
 3 tive job creation and increased domestic capital investment.” Integrity Act § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C.
 4 § 1153(b)(5)(E)(i)). That definitional language tracks the statutory language in the pilot program.
 5 *Compare id.*, with 1993 Appropriations Act § 610(a) (“for the promotion of economic growth, in-
 6 cluding increased export sales, improved regional productivity, job creation, or increased domestic
 7 capital investment”). For all practical purposes, existing regional centers were thus designated us-
 8 ing the same criteria set forth in the Integrity Act.¹

9 Nowhere in the text of the statute did Congress expressly state that existing regional centers,
 10 which satisfy those definitional requirements, were deauthorized or defunct, or that they had to start
 11 the regulatory process anew. “Where Congress has explicitly provided a definition for a term, and
 12 that definition is clear, an agency must follow it.” *Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families v. EPA*, 943
 13 F.3d 397, 425 (9th Cir. 2019). Congress’s definition of regional center in the Integrity Act “clearly
 14 includes” legacy regional centers, making USCIS’s “exclusion of legacy [regional centers] from
 15 the definition of [“regional center”] ... unlawful.” *Id.* The text establishes that Congress defined
 16 “regional center” with purposeful breadth to encapsulate preexisting regional centers already ap-
 17 proved by USCIS in its now-codified Regional Center Program. Congress thus plainly intended for
 18 those existing regional centers to resume their operations without interruption by USCIS.

19 2. Moreover, the Integrity Act explicitly recognizes, and treats as “binding,” approved
 20 Forms I-924 (regional center applications) under the preexisting Program.

21 The Act provides that approved regional center business plans continue to be binding as to
 22 future adjudications. Specifically, the Act states: “The approval of an application under this sub-
 23 paragraph, including an approval before the date of the enactment of this subparagraph, shall be
 24 binding” *Id.* § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(F)(ii)). Prior to the Integrity Act, a business
 25 plan “application” was an amendment to Form I-924, the application for a regional center. To

26 _____
 27 ¹ Indeed, the I-924 approval notices of preexisting regional centers largely tracked this same lan-
 28 guage, confirming they were approved to “promote economic growth.” And as recently as last year,
 regional centers had to submit an I-924A annual certification to demonstrate to USCIS that they
 were still satisfying those same requirements. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(m)(6)(i)(B).

1 receive designation from USCIS, a regional center had to submit a proposal that clearly described
 2 how it would promote economic growth and job creation in a particular region, describing in detail
 3 the amount and source of capital and forecasting the job-creation impacts of its projects. *See* 8
 4 C.F.R. § 204.6(m)(3). The initial application for designation was a Form I-924, and any subsequent
 5 business plan was an amendment to the regional center’s Form I-924.²

6 The Integrity Act declares that “an approval before the date of the enactment of this sub-
 7 paragraph”—the subparagraph being “(F) Business Plans for Regional Center Investments”—is
 8 nonetheless “approval of an application under this subparagraph.” Integrity Act § 103(b)(1) (8
 9 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(F)(ii)). But the subparagraph did not exist before the Integrity Act was enacted.
 10 The only way this text makes sense is if the Integrity Act recognized that previously approved
 11 designations were in fact “approval[s] of an application under [the Integrity Act],” and thus would
 12 continue to bind. *Id.* That is, the Act keys into and supplements the existing regulatory structure of
 13 the Regional Center Program. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(m).

14 This text is incomprehensible if, as USCIS apparently contends, the Integrity Act eliminated
 15 all approved regional centers, forcing them to start over. If that were the case, then the phrase “ap-
 16 proval of an application under this subparagraph, including an approval before the date of the en-
 17 actment of this subparagraph,” would not make any sense. *Id.* A business plan “application under
 18 this subparagraph” can only be approved “before” the subparagraph is enacted if the existing Re-
 19 gional Center Program is understood to survive the enactment of the text in question.

20 **B. Congress designed the Integrity Act to immediately “reauthorize” the Regional**
 21 **Center Program—not to decimate the industry and leave investors without**
 22 **protections.**

23 In addition to those two provisions, the Integrity Act makes clear throughout that Congress
 24 did not intend to start the Program from scratch. Rather, the only way the Integrity Act makes any
 25 sense is if it is understood to simply add new anti-fraud measures to preexisting regional centers—
 26 not to eliminate them all, making every longstanding regional center begin again. Congress in-
 27 tended to breathe new life into the Program and have them “immediately get back to work” in

28 ² *See* USCIS, *I-924, Application For Regional Center Designation Under the Immigrant Investor Program*, <https://perma.cc/AJ2X-H9WF> (explaining that an “amendment” is appropriate to “[a]dd a new commercial enterprise associated with the regional center” or “[n]otify USCIS of changes”).

1 creating jobs and providing a pathway for immigration. 168 Cong. Rec. S1220 (daily ed. Mar. 16,
 2 2022) (statement of Sen. Cornyn). USCIS’s action, however, makes that impossible. The agency’s
 3 action is “incompatible with both the mechanics and purpose of the entire statute. Congress enacted
 4 the [Integrity Act] to restore [the EB-5 program]” immediately, not destroy it by requiring duplica-
 5 tion of government and regional center resources. *Columbia Riverkeeper*, 944 F.3d at 1210.

6 1. As an initial matter, Congress itself described the enactment as a “*Reauthorization and*
 7 *Reform* of the Regional Center Program.” Integrity Act § 103 (emphasis added). Congress’s choice
 8 of the term “reauthorization” demonstrates it did not intend to create an all-new program, divorced
 9 from the preexisting one, but instead to restart the program. *See* Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
 10 *Reading Law* 221 (2012) (“The title and headings are permissible indicators of meaning.”).

11 2. The text demonstrates, moreover, that in adopting the Integrity Act, Congress intended
 12 to fully revive the Regional Center Program with immediate effect. The Act’s additional or modi-
 13 fied requirements for investors’ visa petitions went into effect on the date of Act’s enactment:
 14 March 15, 2022. *See* Integrity Act §§ 102(e), 103(c)(2), 104(b)(1), 105(b). But the portions of the
 15 Act that impose additional anti-fraud and compliance requirements on regional centers state that
 16 those additional requirements “shall take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the
 17 enactment of this Act.” Integrity Act § 103(b)(2). The import of this lag in effective date is to give
 18 both existing regional centers and USCIS a reasonable period of time to implement the additional
 19 requirements, which would then become enforceable at the end of that transition period. Or as one
 20 Senator put it, the “60-day implementation period ... allow[s] USCIS to begin processing EB-5
 21 petitions and applications that have been on hold since the lapse” and “[f]ollowing that initial pe-
 22 riod, *existing regional centers* will be able to *immediately get back to work* driving investment into
 23 the U.S. and facilitating the creation of jobs across the country.” 168 Cong. Rec. S1220 (daily ed.
 24 Mar. 16, 2022) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).

25 Had Congress intended to start all over from scratch, there would have been no need to
 26 specify an alternative effective date for the heightened anti-fraud measures imposed on regional
 27 centers. None would be approved at all until USCIS implemented the new measures in a new ap-
 28 plication process. Again, the text makes sense only if existing regional centers continue to exist.

1 Moreover, the Act provides a mechanism for regional centers to bring their operations and
2 reporting into compliance with the new requirements without losing their designation. Regional
3 centers may amend their proposals, without interruption to their operations (Integrity Act
4 § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(vi)), to report “changes to [their] organizational structure,
5 ownership, or administration,” to report new “individuals not previously subject to the requirements
6 under [the Integrity Act],” and to change “any information, documents, or other aspects of the in-
7 vestment offering described in [a business plan]” (*id.* § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(F)(iii))).
8 By all accounts, any additional certification information regional centers must submit under the
9 Integrity Act falls within those categories. *Id.* (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(iii), (F)(i)); *compare* Dkt.
10 41 (Defs. Supp. Br.), Ex. 2 (Form I-956), *with* USCIS, *Form I-924, Application for Regional Center*
11 *Designation*, <https://perma.cc/5PUB-SYXQ>.

12 The government’s understanding of the statute, by contrast, “undermine[s] the clear expedi-
13 diency that Congress mandated throughout the [Integrity Act] and [is] difficult to reconcile with
14 the purpose of the statute.” *Columbia Riverkeeper*, 944 F.3d at 1210.

15 3. The grandfathering provisions in the Integrity Act also confirm that regional center des-
16 ignations must survive the Act’s passage. The Integrity Act requires USCIS to continue adjudicat-
17 ing pending petitions filed by investors who have put their capital at risk in existing projects spon-
18 sored by preexisting regional centers. *See* Integrity Act § 105(c). That only makes sense if Congress
19 believed that those existing regional centers would continue to exist—otherwise those investors
20 would not just lose any accountability for their investment but also be ineligible for a visa, or per-
21 manent residency, altogether. “We avoid absurd results when interpreting statutes.” *East Bay Sanc-*
22 *tuary Covenant v. Biden*, 993 F.3d 640, 669 (9th Cir. 2021). Yet absurd results are exactly what the
23 government’s construction of the statute produces.

24 An investor’s capital must be at risk and tied to an approved regional center for his visa to
25 be approved, and for the conditional status of his permanent residency to ultimately be removed. 8
26 C.F.R. § 204.6(m)(9); *see also* Integrity Act § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(M)(ii)) (when a
27 regional center is terminated for non-compliance, providing good-faith investors 180 days to reas-
28 sociate their investment with a different approved regional center); USCIS, *Form I-526 Immigrant*

1 *Petition by Alien Entrepreneur*, at 6, <https://perma.cc/XMN7-SPTZ> (requiring evidence of an “in-
2 vestment associated with an approved Regional Center”); USCIS, *Form I-829 Petition by Investor*
3 *to Remove Conditions on Permanent Resident Status*, at 4, <https://perma.cc/9K98-LK83> (same).

4 Congress knew this (indeed it reiterated the requirement in the Integrity Act) and specifi-
5 cally provided that previously approved business plans, including those approved “before the date
6 of the enactment of this subparagraph, shall be binding for purposes of the adjudication” of those
7 investors’ visa petitions. *Id.* § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(F)(ii)). Congress indisputably in-
8 tended to facilitate the resolution of the pending petitions of existing investors. *See* Integrity Act
9 § 105(c). But that is only possible if existing approved regional centers maintained their authoriza-
10 tion upon enactment of the Integrity Act. It would be “absurd” for Congress to expedite those pend-
11 ing adjudications while simultaneously making it impossible for those petitions to be approved.
12 *East Bay Sanctuary Covenant*, 993 F.3d at 669. And it would be equally absurd for Congress to
13 categorically deauthorize the regional centers responsible for those petitioners’ investments, whose
14 participation is necessary for the petitioners to meet the statutory requirements for a visa. The whole
15 point of the Act is to increase regional center “integrity.” It would be entirely contrary to that pur-
16 pose for Congress to remove all USCIS oversight of the hundreds of regional centers sponsoring
17 the billions of dollars of EB-5 investment.

18 4. The Integrity Act’s enforcement mechanisms also make clear that the statute’s anti-fraud
19 provisions are designed to operate against existing, approved regional centers prospectively. They
20 are not designed, as USCIS would have it, to require cancellation of all existing regional centers.

21 The Integrity Act requires the Secretary to “terminate the designation of a regional center”
22 that fails to comply with any of the new anti-fraud and compliance measures instituted by the Act.
23 *See, e.g.*, Integrity Act § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(vii), (F)(v)). The Act therefore estab-
24 lishes a process by which USCIS may *individually* deauthorize existing regional centers for failure
25 to conform with the Act’s new requirements moving forward. Nowhere does Congress mention
26 categorically stripping hundreds of regional centers of their designation. To reach that conclusion,
27 the government must “read into the text” a much broader stroke than the “deliberate” choice Con-
28 gress made. *California v. Trump*, 963 F.3d 926, 946 (9th Cir. 2020).

1 **C. The repeal provision did not deauthorize preexisting regional centers**

2 It is of no consequence that Section 103(a) repealed the pilot program enacted in the 1993
3 Appropriations Act. *See* Integrity Act § 103(a). The government places extraordinary weight on
4 this one sentence—it is the only justification for USCIS’s action—but this language cannot have
5 the far-reaching consequences the government suggests. *See* Dkt. 26 (Defs. Opp. Br.), at 14-17.

6 The government appears to misunderstand the crux of the issue on this point. It spends many
7 words proclaiming that Section 103(a) was a repeal and not an amendment. *See* Defs. Supp. Br. 1-
8 9. Of course it is a repeal. There is no question that Section 103(a) is an express repeal of the text
9 establishing the pilot program in the 1993 Appropriations Act. *See* Integrity Act § 103(a) (“Section
10 610 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
11 propriations Act, 1993 (8 U.S.C. 1153 note) is repealed.”). But that has no substantive bearing on
12 whether Congress categorically erased USCIS’s prior regulatory actions certifying hundreds of re-
13 gional centers, in the context where Congress enacted a materially identical program in the very
14 same statute. The government offers no logical connection between Section 103(a) and the cate-
15 gorical deauthorization of every preexisting regional center, because there is none.

16 Put simply, it is irrelevant whether Congress “amended” the pilot program or “repealed” it.
17 *Contra* Defs. Supp. Br. 5. What matters is whether, in adopting the Integrity Act, Congress captured
18 existing regional centers in the text defining the reauthorized program. It did so.

19 As a legal matter, the pilot program provision repealed by Section 103(a) only required
20 USCIS to “set aside [EB-5] visas” for investors qualifying through investment in a regional center,
21 rather than those qualifying through a direct entrepreneurial venture. *See* 1993 Appropriations Act
22 § 610. The statute itself, therefore, did not certify regional centers as a legal matter—USCIS did
23 pursuant to its regulations. *Id.*; *see* 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(m). Thus, its subsequent repeal has no bearing
24 on the designation of regional centers already approved by USCIS, nor does it change the fact that
25 existing regional centers “ha[ve] been designated by the Secretary . . . on the basis of a proposal for
26 the promotion of economic growth.” Integrity Act § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(i)). The
27 Integrity Act should be understood to operate with the regulatory backdrop presently in force.

28 Moreover, as a factual matter, the most recent reauthorization of that particular statutory

1 provision (the pilot program) had already expired prior to Congress’s enactment of the Integrity
 2 Act (and thus the repeal). *See* Div. O, Title I, Sec. 104 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
 3 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260 (2020) (reauthorizing the pilot program until July 1, 2021). Notwith-
 4 standing that expiration (and consistent with the law described in the preceding paragraph), regional
 5 centers continued to operate and maintain their designation from USCIS—indeed, the agency re-
 6 quired them to submit their annual I-924A certification and fees.³

7 Given this backdrop, Section 103(a) can only be understood to serve an organizational pur-
 8 pose. It could not serve a practical purpose because the pilot program had already sunset and was
 9 no longer in effect. Rather, the express repeal sets the stage for Congress’s codification of the Re-
 10 gional Center Program. The subsequent paragraph, Section 103(b), states that the reformed Re-
 11 gional Center Program will now be memorialized in the Immigration and Nationality Act, and thus
 12 the United States Code. *See id.* § 103(b). The expired statutory provision repealed by Section
 13 103(a), by contrast, had never been codified. The repeal simply demonstrates that Congress no
 14 longer viewed the decades-old and well-established Regional Center Program as a “pilot” program.

15 Finally, the government’s latest suggestion—that the Integrity Act functions in the alterna-
 16 tive to impliedly repeal the preexisting Regional Center Program and thus categorically strip hun-
 17 dreds of them from their designation—fares no better. Defs. Supp. Br. 7-9. The statutory text ex-
 18 plicitly and comprehensively treats preexisting regional centers as if they are a part of the reinvig-
 19 orated Regional Center Program and promptly able to resume their work. The Integrity Act only
 20 makes sense if preexisting center designations survived the Act’s enactment. That is a world away
 21 from a “clear and manifest” intent to strip over 600 regional centers of their designation only for
 22 them to start the process anew. *Rodriguez v. United States*, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987).

23 **II. IF THE STATUTORY TEXT IS SILENT AS TO THE STATUS OF REGIONAL**
 24 **CENTERS, USCIS’S ACTION WAS GROSSLY UNLAWFUL.**

25 As we explained, the statutory text flatly *precludes* USCIS from taking the action it did
 26 here. But even if that were wrong, and there were some statutory gap for USCIS to fill, the agency’s

27 ³ The agency’s post-hoc maneuver to refund filing fees for Forms I-924A does not change that
 28 “the agency continued to accept and collect fees for [Forms] I-924A ... as it had during the prior
 sunset” of the pilot program. Dkt. 41-5, Defs. Supp. Br. Decl. ¶ 10. USCIS treated regional centers
 as designated under the regulatory framework presently in force.

1 flawed and unreasoned website posting is both procedurally and substantively unlawful.

2 **A. The agency failed to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking**

3 “An agency can issue a legislative rule only by using the notice and comment procedure
4 described in the APA.” *Hemp Industries Ass’n v. DEA*, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003); *see* 5
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d). A rule is legislative, and thus subject to the APA’s procedural strictures, if it
6 “create[s] rights, impose[s] obligations, or effect[s] a change in existing law.” *Id.* at 1087.

7 USCIS’s action is a “legislative rule” because it has the “force and effect of law.” *Chrysler*
8 *Corp. v. Brown*, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979). The agency’s website announcement categorically
9 stripped the approval of all existing regional centers. This decision plainly “affect[ed] individual
10 rights and obligations” (*id.* (quoting *Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974))), as regional centers
11 cannot recruit new investors or invest in new projects if they are not certified by USCIS. The
12 agency’s action thus halted, indefinitely and without any warning, their ability legally to function.

13 Furthermore, USCIS has taken the position that, as a result of this action, the hundreds of
14 existing regional centers must initiate *new* legal proceedings—they must apply again for regional
15 center designation. *See* Defs.’ Supp. Br. Ex. 2. Because the USCIS determination obligates regional
16 centers to file new applications, it is necessarily a legislative rule because it has prospective legal
17 force. Indeed, it declares that the results of prior legal proceedings—that is, previously approved
18 regional center designations—are now void. If a regional center wishes to be treated as a regional
19 center, it must file a new application with the agency. “The sole effect of [USCIS]’s decision was
20 to deprive a broad category of [all existing regional centers] the right” to operate their businesses
21 and obtain new investors, “and this effect had legal consequences ... only prospectively.” *Yesler*
22 *Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros*, 37 F.3d 442, 449 (9th Cir. 1994).

23 The government is wrong to contend that USCIS’s action was an “‘interpretive rule’ and
24 not a legislative (or ‘substantive’) rule requiring notice and comment.” Defs. Opp. Br. 16. “Inter-
25 preterive rules ‘simply clarify or explain existing law or regulations’” (*Yesler*, 37 F.3d at 449) in
26 order to “provide[] *guidance* to agency officials in exercising their discretionary power while pre-
27 serving their flexibility and their opportunity to make individualized determinations” (*Colwell v.*
28 *Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.*, 558 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up)). Interpretive

1 rules “do not conclusively affect the rights of private parties.” *Yesler*, 37 F.3d at 449. But USCIS’s
 2 rule indisputably does not leave any individualized or discretionary decision for USCIS officials to
 3 make—the rule *per se* deemed null and void the approval of all preexisting regional centers. And
 4 that rule plainly “affect[s] the rights” of those regional centers. *Id.* It is therefore a legislative rule
 5 subject to the APA’s procedural requirements.⁴

6 USCIS issued this rule without publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
 7 Register or allowing the public an opportunity to comment, as required by the APA. 5 U.S.C.
 8 § 553(b); *East Bay Sanctuary Covenant*, 993 F.3d at 675. USCIS’s action is thus unlawful.

9 **B. USCIS’s action is substantively arbitrary and capricious**

10 The APA obligates courts to set aside agency action that is arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C.
 11 § 706(2). USCIS’s action—taken overnight via a website posting—so qualifies many times over.

12 **1.** To start with, USCIS’s action implements a statute designed to restore the Regional Cen-
 13 ter Program in a way that threatens to destroy it—and, in so doing, it failed to account for the
 14 devastating practical consequences of its action, or to consider less burdensome alternatives. That
 15 is the hallmark of an arbitrary agency action. *See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 208,
 16 232 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[E]very real choice requires a decisionmaker to weigh ad-
 17 vantages against disadvantages.”); *Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA*, 829 F.3d 710, 732 (D.C. Cir.
 18 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[R]easoned decisionmaking requires assessing whether a pro-
 19 posed action would do more good than harm.”).

20 USCIS has a long history of prolonged adjudications in the EB-5 program. Prior to its an-
 21 nouncement, USCIS typically took at least two years, and sometimes up to nine years, to certify
 22 the designation application of a *single* regional center. For instance, in FY2021, the median pro-
 23 cessing time for an I-924 regional center application was 22.1 months, and in that same year, only
 24 *fourteen* new applications were submitted. *See* Exs. A, B. Those prolonged processing times will
 25 necessarily increase exponentially if USCIS is flooded with over *six hundred* applications at once.

26 ⁴ If the government’s characterization of the rule as “interpretive” were correct, then to the extent
 27 there is any statutory gap for the agency to fill (there is not), the agency’s “interpretation” would
 28 not be entitled to *Chevron* deference. “*Chevron* deference applies only to agency decisions rendered
 through formal procedures.” *Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Dep’t of Commerce*, 878 F.3d
 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2017). A website post does not constitute any procedure at all.

1 Nor do legal timelines speed the agency along. Although USCIS is required by regulation to adjudicate a Form I-829 Petition by Investor to Remove Conditions on Permanent Resident Status
 2 within 90 days (8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)), this fiscal year, the median time it has taken USCIS is *41.5*
 3 *months*—which the agency “admit[s]” is far “too long” but justifies because “delays just happen.”
 4 Dkt. 39, 25:13-17; *see* Ex. A. The instantaneous backlog USCIS has created for itself is untenable.

5
 6 The agency did not consider the administrative burden it invented for itself, nor the practical
 7 consequences for regional centers and their investors. By taking this action, USCIS indefinitely
 8 stalled the Regional Center Program, halting billions of dollars in job-creating economic develop-
 9 ment. The agency therefore “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.” *E.g.*,
 10 *Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Dep’t of Commerce*, 878 F.3d 725, 732 (9th Cir. 2017).

11 USCIS had numerous more efficient alternatives available to implement the Integrity Act
 12 without categorically decertifying every existing regional center. Approved regional centers have
 13 already invested millions to secure designation from USCIS, and in fact, each year they have been
 14 required to submit Forms I-924A with updated information to maintain continued designation. Re-
 15 gional centers may continue to operate while USCIS processes their Forms I-924A. USCIS could
 16 quite simply have required existing regional centers to supplement their disclosures with the new
 17 information required under the Integrity Act, or to submit amendments to their existing Forms I-
 18 924. Instead, the agency arbitrarily chose to invalidate all existing designations.

19 By taking a wasteful approach without considering the consequences of its action on the
 20 Regional Center Program—and the resulting economic costs—the agency acted arbitrarily and ca-
 21 priciously. *See Michigan v. EPA*, 576 U.S. 743, 753 (2015). Because USCIS “failed to
 22 acknowledge” the “social costs” of its rule that result from the indefinite delay and likely destruc-
 23 tion of the Regional Center Program, and further because it failed to take “into account this cost,”
 24 its action is unlawful. *Nat’l Family Farm Coalition v. EPA*, 960 F.3d 1120, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2020).

25 **2.** Related, USCIS’s action is “substantively invalid because it conflicts with the plain con-
 26 gressional intent instilled in [the Integrity Act].” *East Bay Sanctuary Covenant*, 993 F.3d at 671.
 27 The Integrity Act made visas available through only September 30, 2027. *See* Integrity Act
 28 § 103(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(i)). Given the historical pace of USCIS’s approval of

1 regional center applications, the enormous backlog created by its announcement, and the adminis-
 2 trative logistics of designing a new process entirely (all problems of USCIS’s own making), it is
 3 likely that USCIS’s “new” Regional Center Program will barely begin operation by the time it
 4 expires. At that point, it will be too late for investors to obtain the immigration benefits at the heart
 5 of this program, harming economic growth and job creation. That was not Congress’s intent.

6 Moreover, the agency’s action has the effect of undermining one of the central features of
 7 the Integrity Act: to strengthen reporting, oversight, and the ability to individually sanction regional
 8 centers for failure to comply with the Act’s enhanced anti-fraud measures. Congress could not have
 9 possibly intended to take all existing controls off billions of dollars of existing Regional Center
 10 Program investments by terminating the designation (and thus the reporting obligations) of the only
 11 entities responsible for oversight of those investments. Yet USCIS—through a website posting—
 12 has now gutted these controls, “conflict[ing] with the plain congressional intent.” *East Bay Sanc-*
 13 *tuary Covenant*, 993 F.3d at 671. For this reason, too, USCIS’s action must fall.

14 **3.** Finally, USCIS erred by failing to consider the regional centers’ “serious reliance inter-
 15 ests” on its “longstanding policies.” *DHS v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020)
 16 (quotation marks omitted). It was “arbitrary and capricious to ignore such matters.” *Id.*

17 USCIS categorically decertified approved regional centers without providing any analysis
 18 or account of the serious reliance interests by both regional centers and EB-5 investors under the
 19 government’s three-decade-old Regional Center Program. Preexisting regional centers have collec-
 20 tively invested millions of dollars in obtaining designation from USCIS. They have employed thou-
 21 sands of workers to manage their businesses. They oversee the aggregation and deployment of
 22 billions of dollars of investors’ capital. And investors made those substantial investments under the
 23 reliance that USCIS would provide regulatory oversight of the regional centers. The agency simply
 24 cast aside these “serious reliance interests”—interests held by regional centers and individual EB-
 25 5 investors alike—without any justification, and thus acted arbitrarily and capriciously. *Encino*
 26 *Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro*, 579 U.S. 211, 224 (2016).

27 CONCLUSION

28 The Court should grant injunctive relief.

Respectfully submitted,

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